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Appellant.

l>UDDAIT AID APPBLLAIT'I
&BID'

STATDDT OJ' IUTURK fa CASB
Tbi• 1• a crillinal ca•• wherein tbe

defendant waa cbar1ed and con•icted of tbe
felon1 of e•be••leaent tor •illfullJ ta11-

in1 to return a rented t1pewriter of a

••lue exceedtn1 $10.00 to it• owner w1tbin ten cta1• att•r tbe rental asree. . nt

had expired, in Yiolation of Utab Code
Annotated Section 78-17-5 (Supp. 1961),
wbicb readll, in part •• pertinent hereto,
as tollon:

Bw.ry person wbo bas leased
or rented a aotur vehicle, trailer, appliance, equ1P119nt, tool or
other valuable tbing, and wbo willfully tail• to return th• •aae to
its owner within ten days after
the lease or rental agre... nt baa
expired, is guilty ot eabezaleaent.
Tbe defendant waived jury trial and
the aatter was tried to the Court without
a Jury.

At tbe end of tbe State•a case

defendant aoYed to di••1•• upon ground&
that the State failed to preaeot aufficieat evidence of an eaaential ele. . nt of
the cr1•• charged, to-wit, tbat defendant'• failure was willful (B. 20-21).
Defendant also llOYed to disaiaa on the
ground& earlier relied upon in aupport of
bis aotion to quash, to-wit, a typewriter
is not

one of the ite.. included within

the statute

(~.

~0-21).

The trial court reeerved rulina on
these aotiona until after presentation of

the defendant'• case.

At the cloae o1

defendant 'a caae the court denied tbe

llO-

tions, found defendant guilty, and sentenced bill for the statutory tera of aotL
l••• tban one year nor aore than ten 1eara
iapriaonaent in tbe atate priaon, wbere cl-.
fendant 1• now aervinc bi• tera.
STATBllElrl' OJ' FACTS

On October 30, 1914, the defendant
entered

xa...1er'a

Sports

~tore

and execu-

ted a ":aental-Loan Acreeaent and Record,"

aubaequently introduced by the State in
tile Trial Court u
(ll. 'and 20).

State'• Exhibit ••A".

Thi• ap-eeaent wu e.xaou-

ted in the defendant'• own correct aaae,
Ken Kaaepper (R. ' and 30 allll State'• Bxbibit "A''.), and reflected. hi• correct
boae and bua1neaa addr••• provided YolwatarllJ by defendant and later verified by
the State'• wltneaa, Don Ka. . . J•r (R. 110 and 13-1').
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The defendant was en1aged in a ao1n1
s1gn paintina business at tbe rreeport
Center io Clearfield, Davia County, Utab,
accordin1 to bis own te•t111<>ny (R 22-33),
and verified by tbe teatiaony of the State'•

onlJ witne••

<•·

13-14).

H• rented tbe

typewriter for the purpoae of typin• buaiaeas correapondence

<•· 22).

Tbe fore1otn1 fact• are wuU.aputed.
Tbe balance of tblA• State. . nt of Fact• •111
be divided into two parta to clarifJ the

iaauea now before tb.ua Court.

TM lint

part •111 be a •Ullll&t1on of the te•tillOnJ
of the State•• only w1toeaa, Don 1a...1er.

Tb• aecond •111 be a ammatioo of tile , . . _
tillODJ of tbe clefeodant•a only •it ..aa,
biMelf.

Tbere 1• no conflict in

tu , .. _

tillony of the two witneaaea.
In addition to tbe fure101n1 tbe
state'• witneaa teatifi•d tbat be oalled

'

the defendant about a week after tbe
typewriter waa to be returned or another
payment •ade and the defendant alle1edlJ
stated he would be in un Saturday to paJ
another aontb'• rent or return the t•pe•riter (R 7-8).

The witness testified

tbat defendant did not co. . 1n on laturdaJ so on Monday be went out to bi• boae,
••rified defendant was li•ins there, and
aearcbed tbe hOll8 for tbe tJpewriter at
tbe iavitatioa of defendant'• r001111ate,
but was .mable to find the t•pe•riter.

(a.

8).

~uain•••

The •itne•• also went out to ta..
adclre•• but found it locked

(I.

9).

Be verified tbat clefelldant bad a plaoe..;;of
business there and be peered ln tbe wtndoWa
obaerYina sign paintina . . teriala and supplies (wbicb bad tbe appearance of bavins
been U11ed) (R. 13-14), but he did not see
the typewriter altbou1b be adaittedly •••

5

not able to see into every conceivable
place

1t

may have been stored (R. 14-15).

In addition to tbe foreso1n1 tbe
State's witness made two phone calls.

One

he made a few days or a week after tile Yi&it
to defendant'• bOIUI (R 8).

Thia phone oall

was aade to defendant'• boae, but defendant
wasn't there (R. 8).

The witneaa alao

phoned the Freeport Center after peering in
the windows and asked tbea if tbare waa a
typewriter there to •bich they replied tlwJ
would check (R. 13-14).

On one otlaer oc-

casion tbe witness went a aaa out to ••• if
be could find tb• defendant at bis residence
but be was not aucceaaful (R. 8), and the
tppewriter has never bean returned (B. 10).
The defendant teatified tlaat be
didn't recall whether anyone ever ooataoted
bia in reaarcls to the typewriter, but lie
ackaowledc•• be knew be bad tile dut7 to
8

see that it was returned (R. 31 and •142).

He

testified that be had soae youn1

aen associated in this Yenture, une by
the llaae of Danny Buckley (R. 23).

One

day when it appeared things weren't 10101

too well with the buaine•• the defendant
put the typewaiter in one of the boy'•

car with whoa Danny rode and instructed
hi• to return it (R.

2•-as

and 37).

Re

doe•n't recall whether he specifically
i u true ted

Dan·ny where the t1pewr1 ter waa

to be returned but he teatified that there

••• nu a1sunderstandins of where it waa to

go (E. 39).

Danny also had aoae drattinar

equipment which belonsed to so. . one other

tban defendant (R. 27).

Soaet11le after

defendant bad delivered tbe typeJrriter to
Danny and after the busines• waa defunct
be approached Danny and asked hi• to return the drattin1 eqaipaent but Dann1 re7

fused, claia!ng

d~tendant

owed bia and

the other boy• llOney tor tbe work tbeJ bad
done (R. 27-28 and 38-39).
h~at@d

There wu a

argument about the equipment and

d@fendant left e•pty banded (R. 39).

Be

neYer bad occasion at that tilta or later
to agatn tbink about the typewriter until
h• was arreeted (ft. 25,21, 30, and 39).

The State'• wtta••• testified 1i wae
about a aontb and a week atter the or111na1
r•ntal that be unsuccessfully atteapted to
contact the defendant ahout the tJpeWSt1,er
(R. 7, 8, and 9).

Tb• defendant teatified

that about two aoatllll after reat1n1 tbe
typewriter be aoved to California (R. 32)
where he was •ubSequentlJ arrested (R. 1819), and where h• bad been uaina b18 correct naae (R. 20).

It was about three

weeks or a aonth prior to this that be
gave the typewriter to Danny (R. 32 and 17).
8

This would be about the aaae ti•e the
rental •iree•ent expired and the State's

•itness was atteaptin1 to contact the defendant.

lt waa on the ba•i• of the foreioiJll
Evidence that tbe Trial Court found the

de1enclant guilty.

POIITS RELllD UPOlf
Point I.

The Evidence Waa I118ufficient
to Support a 11nd1n1 Tbat
Defendant'• failure to Return
tbe Typewriter Waa Willful.

A.

Tbe Trial Court Brred in lailinc to Grant Defendant'• Motton
to D1a•1a• at the Cloae of tbe
State '• Ca11e •

B.

Tbe Trial Court Erred in Findilll
tbe Defendant Guilty at tbe ClOlle
of all the EYidence.

Point II • A Typewriter is nut one of the

Tb1n19 Included in the Statute
Wbicb Create• Cri•inal Liability
tor Willfully fa111DS to Return
Certain

S~e.1ilett .Tbj:s~s.

9

AROUllBNT

Point

I~

The Bv1dence Wu Inat.dtict•nt
to Support a Finding That

D9feadant Willfull{ Jailed to
Re.turn the !7pewrl er.
A.

The Trial Court nrred in Fa111q to Grant Defendant'• llo'iOD
to D1B•iss at tho Close of the

&tat•'• caae.

Becauae tbe lAli•la ture expreul7
atated that one of tbe el... nt• of tile

crille of wbich Defendant ts conYioted 1•
a willful failure, the &tat• bae tile burden of provins beyond a

reaaona~le

doubt

tba t tbe Defe11daat '• failure is willful.

See
state v. Lari•, 78 Utah 183,
2 p 2d 243, 2'9 (1931);

20 All. Jur. Evidence Sec.
134 and 149 (1939).

The State therefore auat preaent auff1c1ent evidence from wbicb. the

flt~t

finder caa

find that Defendant'• failure 1• willful.

Tb• reoord ber• coataiu no direct eYidenoe
10

.ADDITIORAL A'DTllORITJBB TO DD'B11>.Aft
Dlf D'SPPD'B UDF

TD ITATB 07 UTAB -n-

ca..

m mnn

Jfo. 10814

Tbe bett•r reaaoned ca••• bold tbat defeadaat, bJ going forward wltll bi• on ••1-

denee, did aet wa1Ye bi• clai• of error predicated upoa ti.. itrial Co111"t'• r•f-1 to dia-

•1•• at tbe ••• of tbe State'• eaae.
Cepbu w. United Stat••, eM
F. Id 893 (D.C. Cir. 1113).

ltat. •· Baoheller, 89 x •.r.L.
'33, G•, 18 A. 819, 130 (X.J.
8up. Ct. 1118).
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that Defendant'• failure waa •illlul.

Therefore, it becoaee nec..aarr to exa•1ne t.be record to detenaine if tbere •••
aay ••1dence presented by &he State ta
tbeir case froa wbich a fact f 1nder could
inter tbat tbe failure waa willful.
"WilltullJ" 1• defined bJ the IA•iWlat-=e tor purpoeea of tJae Penal Code at
Bect1oa 78-1-3,

u.c.A.

(1813).

Therein it 1• stated tut "wtll:fullJ"
• . • i•pliea alll~lJ a purpoae or w1111ncnea• to cOll•i t tbe act or uu tlMI oataaion referred to. It
not require any intent to
Yiolate law or to injure another or to acquire an1 ad•antage.

do••

While the laat eentenoe quoted above i•
helpful in detena1n1na wllat "•1111111.lJ"

-

doe• not . .an, we aullllit that the clefi-

.

nition proY1ded by

t~•

L•a1slatui·e 1• aot

very helpful in detera1niug what it doe•
ll

aeaa.

To say that "willfullJ" 1apl1••

a •1llinsnes• is less clear than to
••relJ say "willfully" aeana willfully.
To

••1

that it iaplie• a purpoee 1• not

auo• 110re helpful.

The United State• Supreae Court baa
defined willful.

It bae said:

"lWJhen uaecl in a a~ta1nal a tatute it generally aeans an act done
wi tb a bad purpose. . • •1 thout J•t!fiable exouae . • • stubbornl1,
obstinatel1, perversely . • • •
(Citations oattted.)
United State• v. Murdock, 290
U.S. 389, 394, 78 L. Ed. 381,
385 (1933).
Tb• court further explained tbe aeania1 of
willful aa followa:
"Here we are concerned with a
atatute wbicb denouaoea a willful
fa!lure to do vari~us thin.. thought
to ~· requisite to a proper adaini•tration of the inco. . tax law and tbe
Qonrnae11t in tbe trial below, we
think correctl7, •~•uaed that it carried the burden of abowiq aore tbaa
a aere voluntar1 failure to supply
iafor11atton, with intent, in 1ood
12

faith to exercise a privilege grRnted the w:t tneas by the ConLtitution.
The respondent 'e refusal to answer
was intentional and Without lepl
just1-ficatton, but the jury aight

nevertheleas f tnd that 1t waa not
prompted by bad faith or evil intent, which the statute . . kes an
eleaent of the otf•nae."
Id. at 397-398 and 388-387.

Tbe Utah 8upre•e Court bas apparently
never defined "•illfully" as used in the

statutory provision With which we are now
concerned.

However, in a case 1nvolv1QS

the 1nt@rpretat1on of the Worklaan•s Coapeuation Act tblS Court, adoptiq the de-

finition& placed on the phrase by tbe Oklabo. . , Kansas, and Tenneaeee CourtB,
''willful failuro" a•

follows~

.lt7he term "willful failure,"
. . : was beld to aean, not aerely voluntary and intentional, but
to carry •itb it the idea of pre•edi ta tion, obBtinacy, and intenttgnal wrongdoing. . . .
"LWJ1llful failure'' 1• not

necessarjly fulfilled by voluntary
13

d~fined

and intentional oaJssion, but in-

cludes the eleaent o:f intractableness, tht> headstrong disposition

to act by the rule of contradiction ..
il'iillful failure aeanE!.7. • •

something more than negl1~ence and
carrying the idea of deliberation
and intentional wrongdoing."

Western Clay •Metals Co. v.
Industrial COJ1aiss1on, 70 Utah 279
259 Pac 927,928 (1927.)

Certainly if
failure,

1~

0

w1llflll" as it describes

defined to aean

~<>11etbing

•ore

than merely intentional or voluntary tor
purposes of a civil action. then it •ust
likewise be so defined where it constt-

tutea an ele•ent of a crime, taking into
consideration the

require•~nt

of strict

construction of cri•inal statutes and the

parftaount~ot

innocence which

continues throughout the trial of ever1

criainal case.
State v. Dickson, II Utah 2d 8
3ol P.2d 412 (1961). And
14

See

Baylor v. State, 208 8. w.
3d 553 (Texas Ct. Cria. App.,
1948)'

which holds that a statutory presuapttoa

ot intent to COIUlit ftn offense should be
strictly construed for the reasons . . ntioned.

HoweYer, •••n if we aesuae for the
mo•ent that the phrase "•illfullJ fail•"

aeans nothing 110re than "intentionally
fail•", we contend that tbe State did not
pre•ent a "prtaa.facia" case before reettas.
Certainly, if tb• State ltaa the burden of

pro•tns an intentional overt act, all tlae
proaecution need do

1~

proft tbe act aad

the fact finder can infer the intent beca use "It ts a lega 1 pres •l)t ion of law
that every •an 1ntencla tbe n•c••••rJ and
natural or probable consequence• of bi•

Yoluntary act.

. . ."
15

I

Wharton, Cr Utiual Law ~htc. 147

(12th ed. 1932);

(But See. 20 All Jur, RY1dence Sec. 333
(193), wherein this saae rule is announced
but quAlif ied where the criae requires a
willful doine, stating in such a ca•• that
"a specific wrongful intent aust be 111bown. ")

Tbis 1• conaistent with the rationale ot inferential eYidence as expressed by the following authorities:
A prest.lllption cannot ordinarily
be raised froa aoae fact proved unless a rational cunneotion ex1ats
between such fact and the ~ltiaate
fact pre&Ulled. • • • ~47 fact can
be regarded as tbe basia of an inference oaly where tbe inference 1•
a probable or natural explanation
of the fact. Inferenoea .. , not be
drawn froa one transaction to anotber wbicb 1• not apec1f ically coDnec ted with it, aerel7 because the
two reseable each other, but auet
be linked together by the chain of
cause and effect a11d comaon experience."
16

20 Am. Jur. Evidence Bee. 159
(1939).

"L'I]be coocluoion !Which cau be

1011cally ch•awn froa the direct
evid€ r!c~l is \.Jue derived ay the
aid& oi exPttrience and rea~on fro•
the cunaection between the fact$
which are knuwu and t!aat which 1a
uaknvwo • • • • fi.lhe inference 1s

. . de by virtue ut preYious ex&Mri-

e nce of the cuunection between the

kouwn and tlae cli11puted facts • • • • 0

l l!gauru, bVideuoe Sec. 25 (3d
ed. 1940) quot in~ :troa l ii tarkie, ,

Evidence 13 (1824).

Huwever, the mere fact that a pereoa
fa..!!.!_ to pttrfor• au act cloea oot, •• aub•1 t, infe1~ tlla t ·be intendt1d the failure.

And, even aore clearly, it does not infer
that the fail.are was willful.

That ia

(applying the test• •et forth bJ tile above
quoted authorities) ua1nc "the aidll of experience and reason .. we

~nnot

assume tbat

because a pereon tail• to retara propert1

be bas a duty tu return that the failure
was willful; there is
17

110

"rational con-

nectiunu between li>Uch a failw:e anc1 a

Willful &tale uf

a~od;

a willful state

of ailid itd nut a "prubable or ua turnl
explana i..luu uf U1t1 fact" of tbe failure.

lt is just as roas.ouable to preaU11e that
the property was debtroyed, lost, ur stoleo.

It is juat as 1•ea1iouahle to pr•suae

that the

per~ou ~harK•d w~th

the uuty . . t

with au accident before he cuuld pertora.

It is

ju~t

as rensoaable tu pre&uae that

he juwt plaiu forgot.

Aa •tated bJ the

Nu one will be proauaed to ac'
in wanton and/or willful ciiare6{ard
of the rishts of otherM . • • •

No one is preauaed to bave criaiua l •nteat aor ta be mut1vateu
by iat•nts and purposes which w~uld
couvict bi• of iavoluntary criae.
Lipsco•b v. News ~tar World
Pub. Cgrp. 5 So 2d 41, 45
(La., 1941)

li

r.t:' ::,ubait that th.: add:itlonal fact
tel.:i Lt.l .Lt!ri to bj tlw Sta le• s wi ttH~ss,

tba t

hto waa never .;;uccessful in locating ei·ther the Left:ndaut <>r th£• t)lpewr.iter, add&
no tb1n6 from which it can l.>t~ 1.nff:-rred that

the Letenoant's iuilure to return the type.v.r1 ter -aas willful.

We subait thzlt such

meager ue6a tive evidence won• t even sup-

l,)ort :la inference that

clscout1aued

hi~

th<~

Defendant had

busincsJ or left the area.

Even if we could draw such an 1nfArence
from this ev i de nee, it

woult~

be res ting an

inference oa an inference to huld that sucb
an inf'ereuce supportf.:i

the further intere1nc•

tba t Defendant's failure was willful.

Defendant respecttully submits that
the trial

c~urt

erred in failing to &U8'ta1n

bis mut1on to dismiss at the close of tbe
Sta tu • s case .
h.

The Trial Court Erred in F1Dciing

19

the DE>fenda11t Gut lty at the

Clo&e of All the Evidence.

Assuaing the

Stat~

did present suffi-

cient evidenct! frOll which the fact f incler
could have found Defendant guilty, Defen-

dant

~ubmit~

that at tbe close yf hi• ease

with no rebuttal evidence presented by the
State, the fact finder could not have fouDd
hi• ruilty as a matter of law.

In effect

Defendant here contends that had this .atter been tried to a jury, Defendant wuuld

have been entitled to a directed verdict
after all of the evidence was in.
The test of when a directed verdict
ls appropriate is stated very clearly in

tbe follow1u1 quotation fra11
9 Wigaur•1, Evidence
ed. 1H40)

Sec. 2495 (3d

quoting from
Jerke v. Dolaont State Dank, ~4
S.U. 446,223 N.W. 585 (19291:
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"The only rule uf law involved llii that wbicb announceu that
the judge will deteraine the aatter witbvut the assistance of tbe
jury~ wbeu reasonable •inds applied to the evidence could properly cuaf! to bfat one conclusion.

1h• legal principle is s111ple, and
the real question jn ev~ry case 1•
not a question u1 law in any proper
sense of the word, but is a questiun of logic, ur reason, or juqaent (how~v~r we aay chooae to
phrase it), and it is in eacb ca••
a question tor the judge (or for
the appellall cuurt, aa the caae
aay be), and aust reaa1n such a
question, re1ardle•• of tbe adaitted fact that there is no external
standard or yardstick wber•bJ we
aay deteraine •1th ... tbe. . tical
preciaion what result reasonable
atnds aust arrive at in the field
of op10100 or~~dlll•nt by tae application of their intellectual
faculties \o certain 11ven data.
The standard of reasonableness 1•
aubjective, and it 1• &Ile a&aadard
of the judge that •uat be used;
prubably in the f ~nal ana),ai• t~•
standard of tbe Court of last re•urt in any giveA jurisdiction;
but the n~ture of deteraination reaains the aa••. WJaen a Court huldll
in any given case or upon any given
facts, tbat tba direction of a verdict is proper, it is not in anf
strict sense announcins a rule or
21

doctrine of law, but is aerely

announcing its judgment or upio-

.icn as a matter of reasuo and logic that in tbat case and upun
thosefaots reas~nable •1nd• could
nut ditt~r as to the result to be
reached."

That saae case, as quuted by Wi111e>re,
involYed tbe very issue wtth whl•k th1•

Court is now faced; that is, tbe appropriateness of direct101 a verdict in favor of
a party who adduces uncorroborated evideaoe
in the nature of testl•ony of a wttues•
interested in the outco•e of the suit,
which evidence i• not contradicted bJ anr
direct evidence adduced by the oppoaiftS
party.
tile

Ia tbat ca•• tbe part1 requeattns

directed verdict oa the basis of such

evidence, unlike the defendant in Uae ea••

now before the court, bad the ult1. .te bUl'den of proof.

In boldin1 that a directed

verdict waa "hi&hlJ proper" in tbat cue,

the court reasoned as follows:
22

"Our question fart her narrows
to thif> thau: uua-ht a judge to
say, as a matter of reason and
judgment, that the mere tact tnat

a witness 1$ interested in the
matter in cuntroversy, in and of
itself, without regard to other
circUJllStauces of the case, aakes
it reasonable to diabelieve or to
fail tu belic:vc hiai te:atimuuy, in
the light of general ht.man experience) we do not believe tba t any
Court bas gone so far as to lay
down aoy ~ucb doctrine, ur enunciate any such ~eneral principle,
whether it be v1eweo a:ri a aatter
of law, ur as a aatter of logical
rationaiJ.aation. Tb• sound view
aeeas to us to be thia; That each
case aust dupend upon its uwu
facts, and that the aere fact of
iotere~t in the cuntrover~y due~
not in and of itself, and apart
troa other circuawtanceM appear1ns
in the caso, render it a reasonable
thing to a1sbelieve tile testiauny
of ~ witness wboa otherwise it
would be unreanunable to di.abelieve,
and tlis, we think, 1• the establltibed practice of the great aajurity of courts.
"Upon principle, therefore, and
upon the authurities, and upon ib•
previous practice of this Court, we
ar~ ~atisfied that we erred in the
former opinion in adopting, either
expressly or by iaplication, the
doctrine of the Massachusetts Court
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that testimony of au interested

'fli tnesb always aud of necess.i ty
•akea a ju1·y q'1eStion
And we

arc ~a~~sf iea that thci b~tter
vtew, as well aa the one accordin~; WJ. th the prnviuus prt.ctice
of this Court, is that the rule
vf rea$onable judgaent aust be
appliea to each ease upon its
particular facts; and, if the
te&tiaony 1n behalt ~f the party
having the burden of pruot is

clear ana full, not extraordinary or incredible in tbe ligbt
uf seneral experience, and not
coutradicted, either airectly
or indirectly, by other witne•ses, ur bJ circumatances dtacloseo, and ts so plain and eoap~
lete that disbelief therein could
not arise by rational procP.sses
applied to tbe evidence, but
would be whiasical or arbitrary,
then, and in such caae, it is not
onlJ peraiastble, but highly proper. to direct a verdict, and tbe
direction of such verdict should
not bo prevented .. rely by reason of the fact that one or aore
of the witnesses are 1ntereated
14 the transnctiun or tbe result
of the suit."
Ibid.
Our sister •tate of Wyom1ns bas recently enunciated tbe a••• doctrine 1n a
criminal case ldentical in principle &o

the one uow before

tb~s

court.

la tllat

like the case at bar, the state re-

ca~1~,

l1ed ou a mere iufercnce uf the acouaed'a

intent as aga1n¥t the testimony of interested witnesaeH. The accused was convicted of sucond degree aurdor whiob required

a showing that the h\MIOC1de was both purposely and aallciously comaitteu.

Upun

appea 1, the defeudaut contend1n1J the ev1-

dence was 1nsuff icient

t~

uustain n verdict

of second degree mw-der, the Supre1!le Court

of Wyomine: reduced the conviction to -n-

slaughter reasoning

a~

follows

a8

to the

J.ns tant issue:
Where an accused is thf! sole witn~ss

of a transaction charged a.a a

crime, as in the case at bar, bia
testiaony cannot be arbltrsril7 rejected, and if bis credibility ha•
aot been iapeackecl, and bi.a
timony i~ not laprobable, and i• not
incondistent with the facts aDd
c1rcua$tance~ shown, but is reaseaably consistent therewith, tb•n his
testimony should be accepted. Ea~an
v . state·, :sa Wyo. 16 7 , l.aB i>. ~d ~us,

t••

226.

Inferences oontrar1 to direct
test11ton1 are not ordinarilJ autf icient to aupport a findina. Bene.,
in the absence of concerte ewtclence
on the part of the au'• to allow intent, and in the abeence of an7tbtna
to contradict or .tapeacb the teatiaoa1 of defendant and bis wife, there
can be no preauaptlon of law on 1•te n t. ltate v. Panael1, supra. Tile
state therefore failed to prove tbat
tile ktlliaa of MoCullua ... purpoaelr

done bJ •un••

•un•• Y. State, 383 P2d 728, Tit
<•ro 1963).
Tile Dtab lupre• Court earlr acloptefl

tbe poa1t1on that a f1ncl1as of faot oould
not be • upporte·ct onl1 It)' an iaferell08 coatrar1 to direct evidence, ezpreaai. . tu
poaitioa in tbe follo•iDS laquap:
Wlaea f indiop of tile trial eout
are t.•ed ..relr upon a preaumptioa
of fact, aa in tb1• oue, ud the
preauaption 1• entirelJ d1••1pated,
tben there i• no nld.eue ia aupport
of tile findinp, and beaoe, aa laeld
in 8 ta te

Y.

Brown, 38 Utall, •1, 1.0%.

Pac. 841, 2' L.R.A. (K.8.) 145, tbe
•ue•tion ia . .relJ one of law.
Lelaod v aourne, •1 Utab 121,
125 Pac. Ill, 116-857 (1112).
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At this point Defendant reapectfullJ

urae•

tile

Court to carefully re-exaaine

hi• teatiaony as tranacribed for tbe record.

We aublait that bi• teattaon1

. • . is not taprobable, and 1•
not 1ncoaa1atent with the fact• and
circumstance• abown, but is reaaonably conaiatent there•itb. . • .

Bunez v. State, aupra.
Bor was bi• cred1b111t7 iapeaobed in any
particular.

AB ataowa b7 tile record (R.

41 and 44-48) tbe State'• attorae7

aa...

Ol"oa&-

exaained the defendant with v11or, reault-

ins only in a clarification aact re-eapbaai•
of bia direct teatiaonJ tlaat be delivered
poaaeaaion of the t7pewr1ter to one of the
boJ• who waa asaootated with bi• in the

abortive venture and wbo fullJ 11&deratood

that tbe typewriter waa to be returned to

b-•1•r'a (R. 39).

81• poor aeaor, of

the detail• aurround1DS the reatal and re27

turn of the typewriter are wholl1 oonaiatent with the fact tbat the occurrence wae
15 aontlw old at the ti.Ile of tbe trial,
and that at the tiae of the deliver1 of tbe
typewriter to the boJ for return to Kalllae7er 's the defendant was "ba1r-on-end trJia1
to f11ure •bat to do aext." (R. 37).
Thia Court has at least twice reweraed
the lower tribunal'• finding tbat tbere •••
a "willful failure" to perfona a recautretl
aot where the onlJ evicleace adcluoecl ia

au~

port of eucb a findina was an iafereaoe

rai•ed bJ circU11Btantlal ewidence contra27
to tbe direct eYidence add.aced bJ tbe oppoein1 party.

It appeara in both ot tlaeae

cases, altbouab tk• Court cloean•t explioitlJ

so atate, that tbe ••iclence relied upon 1IJ
tb1• Court in 0Yerturnin1 the lower trlbuna l '• findiD11 ••• uncorroborated ewldenoe
adduced by intereated witneaaea.
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Tbua ina proceeding befure tbe Jad•-

trial C011111saioa wherein the injured ••ployee succeaafullJ aaaerted a cla1a for
an iacreaae ot 15 percent in tbe a11aunt
nor-llJ awarded upon IJ"Ollnda tbat tile

eaplo1er willfully failed to coaplJ •ltb
a lawful order of tile C011111••1on, tbla
Court uld tbat tbe eaployee'• ••ideaoe
tr• wbicb t1ut Coma1••1on bad inferred tile
willful failure waa 1nauffic1ent la Yie• of
tbe uncontradicted eYldence adduoed _, tlae
eaplo1er tlaat a ·carpenter bad IMea dlreoted
to coa11truct the

••1••1

cleY10• ~ut ... cle-

l&J•cl beoauae o:f lack of • t•r1a la •

Weatern Clay• . . tala Co.,
•. lncbulh'ial eo-1u1oa, ..199
utab 279, aae Pao. 917
(Utah 1927).
In a •lllilar earlier o••• tbia Court

a1a1a re•eraed an order of lb.a lad.. ,rial
Comaisaion for additional coapeaaatioa
39

holding that there was not any coapetent
substantial evidence to support their
findini that the eaployee'a injuries were
caused bJ the willful failure of his ea-

plo7er to comply with C01111isa1on regulations.

The evidence did clearly show a

failure to coaply with such re1ulat1ona,
but in coaaenting on the evidence tile
Court said:

It is ar1ued ~Y the Asaiatant
Attorney General, on bellalf of
the C01111i•sion, tbat whether or
not the failure ot the eaployer
to coaply with tbe order of the

C011111••1on ••• willful J.a a queetion of tact, and tlaat the Coaaiaaion'• tindina upon tbat aatter
is conclusive and bindin1 upon ua.
Orclinar 1 ly • it UJ be conoeded
tbat an inquiry as to wbetber the

acts of an eaployer are willful
and done in diaregard of the statute or an order of the C01111isalon
leads to the determination of a
question of tact. But where there
is no confliotiDC teetillony in the
record, and where there 1• no dl•pute reapectlng the facta found bJ
30

the cu..iasivn or additional
tacts delineated by the witnesses, the aatter then ~ecoaea
a question of law. Jo re Riley,
227 Mass. 56, 116 I.E. 259.

Pork Utah Mining Co. v.
Iaduatrial C01111iaa1on, 82
Utah 421, 220 Pac. 389 (1923).
for tbe foregoina rea&ollli we aubait

that tbere is no evidence in the record
sufticieot to convince reasonable a1ncla

beyond a reasonable doub' tbat defendant'•
failure to return the t7pewr1ter, if 1n
fact it was not returned, waa willful.
Point II.

A TJpe•riter i• oot One
of the Tbinp Included
in the Statute Wbiob
Create• Crillinal LiabllitJ
for WillfullJ Fa111n1 to
Return Certain Specified

Thinp.

Ta...tatute allesedlJ violated bJ Defendant provide• tbat an1 person •bo renta

or leases "a aotor vehicle, trailer,
ance, equiP!!ent, tool or otber

~P21J...

YAlua~le

tbiy," and fails to return tile ••• •1tlU.n
31

ten days after the rental aareeaent baa
expired i• guilty of eabezzleaent.

(Ba-

pbasis added.)
Utah Code Annotated Section
76-17-5 (Supp. 1985).

Pursuant thereto Defendant was cursed and
convicted of willfully tailiDC to return a

rented typewriter w1th1o
t1oned.

tllllvPll*6dCL~

Herein Defendant urtstia t..bat a

t1pewriter 1a not ou of tile tlli- included i'a the ..._. quoted pbraae .

•hen cou trued in tbe lipt of tra-

d1 t1oDAl rule• of etatutor1 conatruotlon,
the correatoe•• of Defendant's poeition .la

..de clear.

The rule• to which we refer

are the rule tba t penal

11 ta tutes

shall be

strictly construed, the rule of noac1tur a
aooiia ( 0 it is known froa it• aaaociatee")

and the rule of ejusde• generis ("of tlae

saae I.ind").
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As to the rule uf

~trict

cuDMtruction

it is saJ.d;

SO Ali JUR Statute• Sac. 4Us:
statutes are aot to be
extended ia their operation to
peraollfl, things ur acts not within their deacript1ve ter•, or the
fair aud clear illpurt of the laaauace
used . . • • Whatever is not plainly
/"~enal

Within tbe proviaiona of a penal

statute abould be reaarded as Without its intendaeot. • ••
This pbiloaophJ f illda expre••1oa ia
this Court as follows:
. • . where a statute claargea oae

•itb a dut1 ur iapoeea a burden or

a penalty, it awat do so with autficieot claritJ and cie11oitene•• tllat
one of ord1aary intelliaenoe will
understand wbat he 1a required to do.
Rinawood Y. State, a Utah Id
287, 333 P2d 943 (1819).
The

rul•~

of noscitur a aocii• and

ejuadea 1enet1a are be• t explaioecl bJ

tice Crocktttt:

Tbe rule of noscitur a aoc11•,
literally "it 1• knowa fro• it•
aaaociat••," requtr•• tbat the
33

.J•-

•eaning of doubtful words or
phrases be deteratned in tbe
light of and take their character froa associated word& or
phrases. Sutherland in bis
treatise on Statutory Construct ion s ta tfls = " • • • where two
or •ore. words are grouped togeth~r and ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally
compr~hflnsiv~, th~ general words
will be lia1ted ~nd qualified by
thfl special words."

Another closely related rule
which is universally accepted ae
val id ts that of ejuede• sener is , ,
aeaning "of the saae kind", which
rule is that: when general word8
or teras follow specific ones, the
1aneral must be understood as applying to things ot the saae kind
as the specific.
These are, of course, neither
artificial nor arbitrary rules but
arise quite naturally froa the process of reasoning as to what the
statute was intended to aean. CotlllOD sense and experience teach that
when a group of related things are
specif 1cally enuaerated, the mind
ts focused upon that class of th1D19,
and that the addition of general
terms is purposed to avoid inadvertent omission and to include like
things of the same class. tn accord
with this is the fact that if the
broadest aeanlng of the 1enerai ••34

pression were intended, it
would
been' su!ftcieni"
6y l tself withmit any use of
tn~ speclt1c ter...
tlaphi•1•
aClded.)

liave

Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah
2d 368, 37' P2d 839 (1962).

It hardly requires •ent1on1ac to cll'aw

attention to tbe fact that a typewriter 1•

not a aotor vehicle or a trailer.
Conceivably a typewriter could be considered as an appliance, an itea of equip-

aent, or a tool, ua1a1 those tel'Btll ln tlle1r
broade• t sen•• .

Bowe Yer, • acb a broad de-

finition of tho•• tel'llll would aoi be ooaai•tent with the requir... nt• of clarity and

definiteness alluded to in tbe Rin1woocl case,

supra.

Nor would such a coDBtructioa be

consistent with the doctrine of no11citur a
socii•.

Wben tlae Maainp of "appliance,"

"equi19ent" and tttool" are conaidere4. in tlae
lisht of the aore apecif 1c teraa "aotor vebl35

clen and. "trailer" as required bJ that
doctrine, their scope becomes clear.

What

is idcluded within those teras are thin19

of a

~ature

generally associated with aotor

vehicles and trailers.
things which

mi~ht

Excluded are those

be considered appliaDcea,

equipaeut, or tools in the broadest ......
but are wholly unrelated to aotor Yehicle•

aud trailers.

A typewriter is clearlJ not

included.

Of course, a typewriter is a "•aluable
thing" if it bas· any value at all, and Defendant oertainly is not contendiAS tbat
Lile typewriter in question had uo Yalue.

However, had the Legislature aeant to iaclude every valuable thin& within the tel'llll
of the statute when it said "other 't'alua-1•

thinp," it would b••• been aufficient to
use that phrase , , itself without ADJ uae
of the spec1f ic ter. . aa pointed out 1D tlae
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Beatbaan case, supra.

Applying tbe doc-

trine of ejusdea genesis as applied 1n
that ca111e, it beooau clear tJaat the plaraae

"uther valuable thina" includes only 110tor
vebilces and trailer•, and appliance•,
equiJ*eut, and tool.a of a nature generallJ

associated with aotor vehicle• and tralle1'8.
lt is clear tbat the pbraee as so uaed doe•
not include a wholly unrelated tb1DC - a
typewriter.
CONCLUSION

Aaaordin111. it 1• reapecttullJ ur,.d
tbat th• judiP19nt and convtction of tbe
trial court be re•••••d and tbe Defendant

b•

order~d

discharged trOll custody.

Reapectfully subllitted _,,
s. WARSBR, A••oei•t• of

FRAJfK

YOOtfG, THATCBHR • GLAlllAJDI
lOli 1'1nt SecuritJ aank 81q. •

Ogden, Utah

Attorne1• for Defendant aad

Appellant

37

ADDITIOJIAL AlJTJIOJtITIU TO DD'BDAIT
DX IDPPBR'S BltJD'

TD STATS OF VTB -••- DJI DEPn&
C&M Ito. 10914

Tlae proper applioatioa Qf tlae ..iea ef

•j•de• s•neris au aoeoitur a aooti• to tM
atatut-*7 fl%OV1a1o.a in 41uatioa n,111n a

coutruetion -lUitli•s a ._.writer, ,,...
it• operat1oa.
State Laacl Board 'f'. State De,.rtlleat
of i' i•ll aatl , 17 UtaJa N llT,
408 P2d 707-(1961).

(Tai• oaae ap~ar• to be '11'••t1J
ooabu., to th• ••Pili Plaater
oaae eited on pal• 15 of ID
State'a IWief .)
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